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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 05-5550
________________
AUGUSTUS C. PATTERSON,
Appellant
v.
GLAXOSMITHKLINE PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY;
GEORGE HANNUM; MICHAEL MANACCHIO
_______________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 04-cv-04202)
District Judge: Honorable R. Barclay Surrick
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 25, 2006
Before: SLOVITER, SMITH and VANANTWERPEN*, Circuit Judges.
(Filed October 25, 2006)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM,
Appellant, Augustus Patterson, appeals the District Court’s order denying a post-
judgment motion filed in a case previously dismissed upon settlement under Local Rule 
___________________
*The Honorable Franklin S. Van Antwerpen assumed senior status on October 23, 2006.
241.1(b) of the United States District Court Rules for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s order in part and remand
the matter for further proceedings.
Patterson initially filed the underlying complaint alleging race discrimination in
the District Court in a pro se capacity against “GlaxoSmithKline Pharmaceutical
Company.”  Attorney Reginald Allen thereafter entered an appearance on Patterson’s
behalf, and filed an amended complaint naming two of Patterson’s supervisors as
defendants and asserting claims based on a racially hostile work environment, racially
disparate treatment and harassment, retaliation and various Pennsylvania state law torts. 
After discovery had concluded, appellees filed a motion for summary judgment.  While
appellees’ motion for summary judgment was pending, the parties pursued the possibility
of settlement.  Although no agreement was reached during a settlement conference
conducted before the District Court on July 8, 2005, negotiations apparently continued
and resulted in the parties’ agreement to settle the case on August 31, 2005.  Appellees’
counsel promptly notified the court of the settlement, and the District Court entered an
order on September 1, 2005 dismissing the action with prejudice pursuant to Local Rule
41.1(b).
On December 6, 2005, Patterson filed with the District Court a pro se “Motion to
Formally Remove Petitioner’s Attorney from Case #04 CV 4202, Sanction Petitioner’s
Attorney, Allow Pro Se or Substitute Representation and Rule on Relief Requested
Herein.”  As the caption suggests, Patterson’s motion contained a request that the District
3Court remove Attorney Allen from the case and allow Patterson to either represent
himself or to obtain “alternative representation” so that, presumably, he could pursue his
“pro se counter proposal” with counsel for appellees.  Patterson also included in this
motion criticisms of his attorney’s performance during the taking of depositions, as well
as allegations that Attorney Allen failed to provide him with relevant information and
details regarding the proposed settlement agreement.  Patterson alleged that, although he
had learned on September 19, 2005 that the case had been dismissed, he did not learn of
the actual contents of the settlement agreement until December 1, 2005, when he received
a letter from appellees’ attorney dated November 28, 2005 enclosing a copy of the
agreement.  Patterson requested an expedited response on the motion, apparently
believing that such action was required in order for him to file an application for workers’
compensation with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Labor and
Industry Bureau of Workers’ Compensation.
In a one sentence Order entered on December 9, 2005, the District Court denied
Patterson’s motion given the court’s dismissal of the action pursuant to Local Rule
41.1(b) three months earlier.  Patterson appeals that decision, and basically argues that
fraudulent conduct on the part of Attorney Allen warrants the reopening of proceedings
and submission of this case to a jury.  Appellees, on the other hand, contend that the
District Court acted within its discretion in denying Patterson’s motion to remove
Attorney Allen given the fact that the court had dismissed the action with prejudice three
months prior to the filing of appellant’s motion.  Appellees further argue that, even if
4Patterson’s motion were liberally construed as a motion seeking to set aside the order of
dismissal, it was untimely filed under Local Rule 41.1(b).  Finally, if construed as a
motion filed pursuant to one of the provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), appellees argue
that such relief is not warranted given Patterson’s delay in filing the motion and given his
actions in attempting to “strategically” renegotiate the settlement agreement with
opposing counsel so as to avoid the contingency fee payment obligations owed his
attorney.
We can find no abuse of discretion on the part of the District Court in denying
Patterson’s post-judgment motion to the extent Patterson sought to remove his attorney so
that he could pursue the matter in a pro se capacity or seek the assistance of another
attorney given the court’s entry of an order on August 31, 2005 dismissing the case with
prejudice.  Likewise, to the extent Patterson’s motion sought to set aside the order of
dismissal under Local Rule 41.1(b), it was indeed untimely filed.  Accordingly, we will
affirm the District Court’s order in that respect without further discussion.
However, affording Patterson’s pro se filing the liberal construction required by
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), appellant’s motion could also be construed
as one filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).  Appellees argue that, even if so construed,
we should affirm the District Court’s order denying Patterson’s motion because he does
not merit relief under any of the subsections of Rule 60(b).  We decline appellees’
invitation.  In light of the District Court’s very summary order of dismissal, we cannot say
that Patterson’s motion was given consideration by the District Court as a motion filed
5pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).  Moreover, although appellees argue that Patterson’s
delay of two or three months in seeking relief under Rule 60(b) was an unreasonable one,
we conclude that this is a consideration best addressed by the District Court in the first
instance.  See, e.g., Lasky v. Continental Products Corp., 804 F.2d 250, 255 (3d Cir.
1986) (while a District Court judge may consider the expiration of the Local Rule’s 90-
day limitation period, the “reasonable time” provision of Rule 60(b) controls the
determination of whether appellant’s motion was timely filed).
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court in part and remand
the matter for further proceedings.  Appellees’ motion to seal the settlement agreement
attached to appellant’s informal brief and for leave to file Volume II of the Supplemental
Appendix under seal is granted.
